Hans Kelsen remains, for the most part, a towering and enigmatic figure to students of legal philosophy. In his Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen attempted to raise jurisprudence to the level of genuine science, divorcing it from ideology and personal evaluation. Legal scientists, Kelsen maintained, must restrain themselves from acting upon the prescriptive impulse that often accompanies the description of a legal system.
In an effort to trace Kelsen's attempt to scale the great snowy mountain of thought concerning the basis for legal norms, Richard Tur 1 and William Twining 2 present Essays on Ke/sen. No attempt to collect essays on Kelsen's jurisprudence has succeeded in over two decades. 3 Daunting as that bleak reality may have been, Tur and Twining have prevailed, producing a collection of essays based upon papers presented at the 1981 annual conference of the United Kingdom Association for . At the conference, thirteen scholars celebrated the centenary of Kelsen's birth by defending, testing, or simply clarifying much of Kelsen's work. In addition to these essays, the book contains a translation of Kelsen's The Function of a Constitution (p. 109).
The term "celebrated" is employed here rather loosely. What distinguishes Essays on Ke/sen from earlier endeavors is the willingness of its contributors to attack every assumption Kelsen or his followers have made. Past collections of essays have exhibited a tendency to apply polish rather than acid to Kelsen's theories. 4 Because Essays on Ke/sen refrains from such adulation, it stands as a more provocative tribute to Hans Kelsen.
One should attack Essays on Ke/sen as one does a baked potato: from the middle outward. Specifically, the reader should begin with at least a cursory reading of Iain Stewart's 5 translation of Kelsen's The Function of a Constitution (p. 109). There simply is no better way to view the high country of the Pure Theory than through Kelsen's own eyes, and Stewart's crisp translation enables the reader to do just that. In addition to supporting its stated thesis, that a constitution serves to REv. 474, 485 (1934) 
[hereinafter Method and Concepts).
According to Kelsen, the validity of one norm is derived from another, "higher" norm. P. 111. Consider the norm, "one who steals ought to be punished." The validity of that norm comes from a norm expressed in the form of a criminal statute. In tum, the validity of that statute comes from the norm, "the legislative body has the authority to make laws." Continuing this analysis, the validity of legislative authority is derived from the constitution, which grants lawmaking authority to the legislature.
Given this hierarchical perspective, it is easy to understand Kelsen's view that a constitution serves to validate lower norms. The norm that validates a constitution is Kelsen's "basic norm." Pp. To Kelsen, the link between the elements of a legal norm -the delict (wrong) and the sanction (penalty) -is like the idea of causality connecting antecedent and consequent events in the laws of natural science. See Method and Concepts, supra note 6, at 485 ("Just as natural law links a certain circumstance to another as cause to effect, so the legal rule links the legal condition to the legal consequence.").
9. An attempt to map out Kant's epistemology and metaphysics -often the subject of an entire university course -in one footnote would be both arrogant and futile. However, a brief review may place Kelsen's analogy in clearer focus.
Kant's famous Critique of Pure Reason was, in part, an objection to empiricism, the belief [Vol. 86:1470 Wilson uncovers several difficulties. First, she questions Kelsen's use of the Kantian notion of categories 10 beyond the phenomenal ("is") to the normative ("ought") world. 11 As Kant found twelve a priori concepts that order the chaotic jumble of colors, sounds, and smells that make up the universe, so, Wilson summarizes, "Kelsen wants us to believe that legal materials are ordered and unified in a system because we have, contained a priori in the original powers of the mind, the principle of Zurechnung" (p. 55). Wilson not only points out that the normative realm is terra incognita to Kant's categories, but also argues that Kelsen's analogy may be anti-Kantian because Kant himself refused to apply his transcendental method beyond the phenomenal realm (pp. 55-56).
In addition, Wilson argues that Kelsen's zurechnung bears no familial resemblance to Kant's a priori categories. Specifically, Wilson that knowledge is derived directly from the senses. In it, Kant contends that there are aspects of reality independent of sensation. Kant calls these aspects a priori.
According to Kant, a priori concepts are part of a mental apparatus which orders the physical world into comprehensible form. A few examples should clarify this notion. One example of a priori knowledge is space. We cannot see space. Nor can we perceive it by any of the other senses. Instead, space is an "intuition" that our mind applies to the sensory data it receives. In Kant's view, unless we apply these a priori concepts, which he divides into various categories, see note 10 infra, the world is an incomprehensible jumble of stimuli, which have no inherent order of their own.
It may be helpful to consider a rather American application of this German philosophy. Mom places her famous apple pie in the refrigerator and closes the door. Our sensory data tell us that this time-honored delicacy has disappeared. Yet this observation never develops into a thought because we apply the a priori concept that the world has continuity to it. Thus, Kant concludes, what we consider reality is really a synthesis of a priori concepts and the constant flow of sensory data. Scholars differ over whether Kant believed the light went out when the refrigerator door was closed.
Having reviewed Kant's basic stance, the notion of causality as an a priori concept is easier to comprehend. Just as the a priori concept of space operates as a lens through which we view the jumbled physical world in spatial terms, so does the a priori concept that events have causes render our view of reality in causal terms. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON *189-211.
For a concise exegesis of the six proofs Kant employed to establish his theory, see N. SMITH, A COMMENTARY TO KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REAsON" 363-81 (1918 128-36 (1908) . 11. Pp. 55-56. Kelsen believed that human behavior could be the subject of both phenomenal and normative interpretations. On the one hand, it can be the subject of empirical statements such as: "If people run rapidly up a mountain, their heart rates will increase." On the other hand, human behavior can also be viewed as the subject of normative statements such as: "If people run up mountains they ought to be punished." Kant's Critique dealt with the first sort of statement; Kelsen attempted to apply Kant's analysis to the second sort. See GENERAL THE-ORY, supra note 8, at 445. Imputation (imputatio) in its moral meaning is the judgement by which someone is regarded as the originator (causa libera ['free cause']) of an action. . . . If this judgement also carries with it the juridical consequences of this deed, it is a judicial [rechtskrizftig] imputation .... The juridical effect of demerit is punishment (poena) . [pp. 70-71] In light of this resemblance, Steiner concludes that while each theory has its problems, they are nonetheless quite similar. Unfortunately, Steiner overlooks the fact that his Kant, the ethical absolutist, is not Wilson's Kant, the epistemological relativist.
An equally provocative dialogue deals with the role, if any, justice plays in Kelsen's Pure Theory. Fortunately, the discussion does not wind down the trail of earlier endeavors to show, once and for all, that Kant's ethical relativism does not bespeak amorality or immorality, but manifests an unwillingness to believe that absolute values are demonstrable by cognitive verification. Instead, the discussion moves headlong up the summit of Kelsen's avowed ethical relativism.
In Pettit reacts to what he feels is an unnecessarily harsh reading of Kelsen; in effect, he attempts to rehabilitate the Pure Theory from Bjarup's cross-examination. For example, Pettit tries to salvage Kelsen's position on tolerance by drawing a distinction between evaluations and prescriptions, the former relating to tolerance as a product of practical reason and the latter relating to norm-creation (pp. 313-14) . In this endeavor Pettit behaves like a desperate attorney trying to present the testimony of his star witness through ventriloquism. That is, Pettit draws distinctions that Kelsen either neglected or refused to make. In the end, Pettit can ask only that Kelsen not be read too literally.
Pettit's attempt to defend Kelsen reflects a general impulse -to cut the Gordian knot of seeming contradiction with a sharper version of Kelsen's theories -that runs through many of the essays. Fortunately, the book's dialectical format serves to expose any such misconceptions of (or disloyalties to) Kelsen's body of work.
A final refreshing feature of Essays on Ke/sen is its almost uniform clarity. Kelsenian scholarship generally brings to mind pages of encyclopedic sentences which leave subject and predicate completely out of shouting distance of each other. Such obscurity almost invariably signals an intellectual fog ahead. When scaling the dizzying heights of Kelsen's work, such fogginess is neither desirable nor, as Essays on Ke/sen demonstrates, necessary. For modern readers, these essays present a safe and invigorating ascent into the high country of legal positivism.
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